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Consumption baskets vary across households and inflation rates vary across goods. As a 
result, standard CPI inflation may provide a very misleading measure of the inflation 
actually faced by poor households, more so the more unequal the distribution of 
aggregate consumption across households. Likewise, changes in observed nominal 
consumption inequality may be very different from those in true inequality, i.e., that 
measured using household-specific CPIs. We explore empirically these issues using 
household data covering nine episodes from four Latin American countries (Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). We find that in these countries standard CPI inflation 
typically reflects the inflation rate faced by a rich consumer located in the 80 to 90 
percentile of the distribution of consumption expenditure. In most episodes we also find 
that inflation was anti-rich -- i.e. the inflation faced by the richest consumers was higher 
than the inflation faced by the poorest consumers. As a result of this bias, the observed 
increases in nominal inequality generally exceed the actual changes in real inequality. 
These results are robust to correcting for quality change bias in the CPI, to the use of 
alternative price indices, and to the use of alternative inequality measures. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
The consumer price index (CPI) is the key economic indicator monitored by economic 
analysts and the general population to gauge the cost of living. Yet differences in spending 
patterns across households imply that the consumer price index relevant for each one will differ 
as well. For example, the elderly tend to spend more on health care than the young, while the 
poor typically spend a higher proportion of their income on food than the rich do. When these 
differences in consumption patterns occur in parallel with persistent differences in the rate of 
change of prices across goods, different households in effect face different rates of inflation. 
 
If household-specific inflation rates vary a lot across households, the inflation rate of the 
standard CPI may become a very poor guide to the relevant inflation rate experienced by those at 
the bottom of the income distribution. This is easily understood by noting that the standard CPI 
is a weighted average of individual households￿ price indices, with the weights given by their 
respective shares in aggregate consumption expenditure. In practice, this means that the inflation 
rate of the standard CPI generally does a better job at tracking the inflation rate faced by rich 
households (who spend more on consumption, and hence weigh more in the index) than that 
faced by poor households ￿ the so-called ￿plutocratic bias￿ of the CPI (Prais 1958). As a result, 
when households face different inflation rates the use of standard CPI inflation to determine cost-
of-living adjustments of minimum wages, pensions, and other transfers may result in 
unanticipated welfare gains or losses for pension and transfer recipients and minimum wage 
earners. 
 
More generally, the fact that different households face different inflation rates also means 
that changes in the distribution of real income or expenditure across households are driven not 
only by changes in the commonly-measured distribution of nominal income or expenditure, but 
also by the time path of their respective inflation rates. Indeed, with an appropriate pattern of 
household-specific inflation rates, it would be perfectly possible to observe an inequality-raising 
redistribution in nominal terms, when in reality the real income or expenditure distribution has 
become less unequal -- and conversely.  
 
Clearly, the same reasoning applies to inequality comparisons performed across countries 
rather than over time. Unless the law of one price can be assumed to hold across countries, it is 
not clear how much of an observed cross-country difference in a particular inequality index 
(computed on the basis of nominal incomes) may be due to real inequality and how much to 
price differentials among countries. 
 
Of course, the practical relevance of this discussion depends on the degree to which 
households with different income levels actually face different inflation rates. This issue has 
attracted some attention in the empirical literature. For the case of the U.S, Hagemann (1982) 
found some evidence that over 1973-82 households in the top income decile had experienced 
lower inflation than the rest. In turn, Garner, Johnson and Kokoski (1996) and Moulton and 
Stewart (1999), working with longer time series, found very little difference between the 
inflation rate faced by the poor and that of the general population.  
 
More recently, Hobijn and Lagakos (2003) have reexamined the variability of inflation 
over 1987-2002 across U.S. households with different characteristics. Their main finding is that 
the elderly generally faced higher inflation than the rest (a difference of about .4 percent per   2
annum), mostly due to the rising relative cost of health care.
1 In contrast, they do not find 
systematic differences between the inflation rates faced by rich and poor households, nor 
between those of urban and rural households.
2 
 
Inflation inequality has also attracted some attention outside the U.S. For the U.K., 
Crawford and Smith (2002) find that poor households experienced significantly lower average 
rates of inflation than rich households over 1976-2000. For the case of Argentina, which 
experienced large fluctuations in inflation over 1989-1998, Lodola et al. (2000) find that on the 
whole the poor suffered lower inflation than the rich in high-inflation years, and the opposite 
happened in low-inflation years. For Taiwan, Lieu, Chang and Chang (2001) conclude that in 
1991-96 inflation was persistently higher for low-income and urban households.  
 
In Hong Kong, the Census and Statistics Department actually computes three consumer 
price indices by income bracket (in addition to the standard CPI).
3 In the year 2000, for example, 
the inflation rates of the three group-specific indices were, respectively -2.8, -3.8, and -4.5 
percent, while the overall CPI fell by 3.7 percent. Thus, the differences in inflation rates across 
income groups were fairly substantial, given the relatively low levels of overall inflation.
4  
 
Few papers have focused explicitly on the distributional consequences of inflation 
heterogeneity. Ruiz-Castillo et al (2002) use Spanish data to explore the distributional 
implications of adjusting household-specific price indices for quality-change bias. In turn, 
Crawford and Smith (2002) reassess the trends in UK inequality over 1975-2000 using 
household-specific CPIs, but find that the results are highly sensitive to the choice of base year 
for the indices. 
 
It is worth noting that these issues are closely related to, but conceptually different from, 
the question of whether inflation is more harmful for the poor than for the rich. This has been 
explored by a fairly sizable literature (see e.g., Easterly and Fischer 2001 for discussion and 
further references), focused on the workings of mechanisms such as indexation of prices, wages 
or financial assets and liabilities. Our analysis is not concerned with these issues, but with the 
measurement of real income and inequality under household heterogeneity.  
 
This paper uses household survey data to explore the empirical significance of inflation 
inequality in nine episodes corresponding to four Latin American countries: Brazil (1988-1996), 
Colombia (1997-2003); Mexico (1984-1989; 1989-1994; 1994-1996; 1996-2002), and Peru 
(1995-1999; 1999-2001; 2001-2003).  These countries seem well suited for this kind of analysis, 
given that some of them (e.g., Brazil, Colombia) are among the most unequal in the developing 
world, while others (e.g., Peru) not only suffer high inequality, but have also shown a 
deteriorating trend in recent years (see DeFerranti et al 2004 for details). 
                                                 
1This issue has gone beyond scholarly debate, and a proposal currently with the House of Representatives 
(H.R.2035, 2001) would require the Bureau of Labor Statistics to build a special consumer price index for the 
elderly.   
2Regarding the rural/urban inflation differential, Hobijn and Lagakos (2003) conclude that its fluctuations are mainly 
driven by the relative price of gas, due to the fact that rural households devote a much larger expenditure share to 
gas than do urban households.  
3 Specifically, CPI-A is based on the expenditure patterns of the bottom 50 percent of the population, CPI-B refers to 
the next 30 percent, and CPI-C is built for the next 10 percent. 
4 This is noted by Ley (2005).   3
To anticipate some of the results below, we find that: (i) in the countries under 
consideration, standard CPI inflation typically reflects the inflation rate faced by a consumer 
located in the 80 to 90 percentile of the expenditure distribution ￿ in other words, CPI inflation 
tracks the inflation rate of fairly rich individuals; (ii) in most of the episodes we analyze, 
inflation has been anti-rich -- i.e. the inflation rate faced by the rich was higher than that faced by 
the poor; (iii) inflation heterogeneity across households accounts for a significant chunk of the 
observed changes in nominal inequality; and (iv) in general, the observed changes in nominal 
inequality provide an upward-biased measure of the true changes in real consumption inequality 
over the episodes under analysis. 
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines a simple analytical 
framework. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the empirical results, and assesses 
their robustness by exploring a number of departures form the basic specification. Finally, 
Section V concludes.  
 
 II. A basic framework 
 
II.1 Individual and plutocratic consumer price indices 
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In contrast, the standard aggregate (or plutocratic) CPI is given by: 
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Hence the weight of each good￿s price in the aggregate consumer price index  0 i s  is itself 
a weighted average of the shares of that good in individual households￿ overall consumption 
spending  
h
i s 0  (i=1,￿,N; h=1,￿,H), with weights 
h
0 θ  given by the share of each household￿s total 
consumption expenditure in aggregate consumption expenditure in the base year. Thus 
households with relatively large consumption levels will be assigned larger weights, and as a   4
consequence  0 s  will be closer to their individual 
h s0  than in the case of poor households. 
Formally, the difference between the individual and the overall CPI is, from (1) and (2), 
 










0 θ , the closer s0 is to 
h s0 , and thus the closer the aggregate CPI to cpi
h In the 
limit, as  1 0 →
h θ  for some h, 
h s s 0 0 →  and the overall CPI would be identical to that of 
household h.  
 
In simpler terms, with heterogeneous consumption baskets the overall CPI tends to mimic 
the individual price index of the better off. This is what Prais (1958) termed the ￿plutocratic 
bias￿ of the CPI. Moreover, for a given level of total and average consumption expenditure 
across households, the more disperse their individual consumption levels (i.e. the more unequal 
society is), the less representative the overall CPI will be of the consumption price index faced 
by those at the lower end of the distribution ￿ i.e., the larger the plutocratic bias. 
 
  Finally notice that the difference between the inflation rate affecting household h and 
overall CPI inflation is given by 
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This is zero when either (i) all prices change in proportion (i.e.,  0 , 1 0 , − = t t p k p  for some scalar k), 
or (ii)  0 0 s s
h = , so individual and aggregate CPI shares are the same. As we show below, these 
two conditions are clearly violated in practice.  
 
II.2 Inflation inequality and observed inequality 
 
As noted earlier, when inflation rates differ across individuals the distributions of 
nominal and real consumption may follow different paths. Observed changes in standard 
inequality indices (which are typically computed from cross-sectional nominal income or 
expenditure data) may offer a misleading picture of the trends in real income or consumption 
inequality, which are the relevant ones from the welfare perspective. For example, it would be 
perfectly possible for real inequality increases to be offset by price inequality declines, so that by 
just observing nominal quantities one may get the mistaken impression that no change in 
inequality has taken place.  
 
Following Ruiz-Castillo, et al. (2002), let x(xt) denote some inequality index (which is 
assumed to be an increasing function in the level of inequality) in period t, where 
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Dx  =  x(xt) - x(xt-1) = x(xt) - x(xt,t-1) + x(xt,t-1) - x(xt-1),      (4) 
 
or in condensed form  
 
Dx  =  DxQ + DxP.           ( 5 )  
 
Thus, the total change in the inequality index of the nominal consumption vector x 
(henceforth ￿nominal inequality￿ for short) can be broken down into a component DxQ that 
captures the effects of changing consumption quantities (i.e. changing real inequality) and 
another component DxP that captures the effects of changing consumption prices (i.e. inflation 
inequality). Notice that, holding constant real inequality, nominal inequality can change in 
response to price changes. In fact, if price changes are anti-poor then DxP < 0: prices rise faster at 
the lower tail of the distribution than at the upper tail, and hence for a fixed bundle of goods the 
relative spending of the poor rises. In such case, it follows that Dx < DxQ. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
for given real inequality, anti poor price changes reduce nominal inequality, giving the (false) 
appearance of an improving distribution. Similarly, anti-rich price changes imply DxP > 0 and, 
ceteris paribus, lead to higher nominal inequality, giving the (again false) impression of a 
worsening distribution. 
 
III. Empirical results 
 
III. 1 Data 
 
Inflation differentials across consumers are driven by two factors. The first is the 
difference in consumption patterns across individuals. The second is the difference in inflation 
rates across goods. Hence, for our empirical analysis we need two ingredients: data on the 
consumption patterns of different households, and data on the trends in the prices of different 
groups of goods. We take the data on consumption patterns from household expenditure surveys, 
which contain relatively detailed information on the type of goods and services consumed by 
different households. Depending on the country under consideration, consumption is 
disaggregated into 7 or 8 major categories, although finer partitions are usually possible. As for 
the matching price data, we rely on the disaggregation of the overall CPI by category of 
expenditure, which is usually available from national sources (typically the Central Bank). 
 
Table 1 offers summary information on the expenditure surveys used in the empirical 
analysis. The surveys correspond to four Latin American countries and allow constructing nine 
inflation spells: one each for Brazil (1988-1996) and Colombia (1997-2003), four for Mexico 
(1984-1989, 1989-1994, 1994-1996, and 1996-2002) and three for Peru (1995-1999, 1999-2001, 
and 2001-2003). The nine spells span periods of time of varying length: 8 years in Brazil, 6 years 
in Colombia, between 2 and 6 years in Mexico (for a grand total of 18 years),  and between 2 and 
4 years in Peru (for a combined total of 8 years).  
 
Tables 2 to 5 report for each country the budget shares devoted by each quintile of the 
expenditure distribution to the various categories of goods and services: apparel, education, food   6
and beverage, housing, health, transport and communications, and other goods and services.
5 The 
exception is Brazil, for which we only have six expenditure categories, as education is included 
in other goods and services.  Inspection of these tables reveals that in all countries lower 
quintiles tend to spend relatively more on food and beverages, whereas upper quintiles tend to 
spend relatively more on the consumption of services such as education, transport and 
communication, and other services.  
 
For example, in Colombia in 2003 (Table 3) the first quintile of the distribution devoted 
45 percent of their spending budget to food and beverages, against 21 percent devoted to the 
same end by the fifth quintile. These shares are roughly similar to those found in Mexico in 2002 
(Table 4). In Peru (Table 5) the shares of spending allocated to food in 2003 were even higher, 
but the relative pattern across quintiles was similar -- 55 percent for the first quintile, versus 33 
percent for the fifth. In contrast, in Brazil in 1996 (Table 2) the share of food was lower, but still 
three times as high for the first quintile as for the fifth quintile (37 percent versus 13 percent).  
 
The other side of the coin is the expenditure on transport and communications. In Brazil, 
this attracts 12 percent of the expenditure of the first quintile, versus 25 percent of the fifth. The 
situation is similar for Colombia (8 percent versus 14 percent), Mexico (10 percent versus 20 
percent), and Peru (4 percent versus 14 percent). The poor also tend to spend less on housing 
(although the inter-quintile differences in Colombia and Mexico are small) and education.  
 
On the whole, the data suggests major differences in consumption patterns across 
household groups. Moreover, Tables 2 to 5 also suggest that these patterns are fairly persistent 
over time, although there are some exceptions. For example, in the case of Brazil Table 2 shows 
an increase in the expenditure shares of housing (from 25 to 33 percent) and transport and 
communications (from 16 percent to 21 percent). The share of housing also increased in 
Colombia, from 15 percent in 1997 to 26 percent in 2003, but fell in Peru, from 35 percent in 
1995 to 15 percent in 2003. Finally, in Mexico the most remarkable development was the 
declining share of food, from 37 to 28 percent over 1984-2002.   
 
As already stressed, differences in consumption patterns across individuals provide only a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for inflation inequality. The other required ingredient is a 
changing relative price structure. Table 6 summarizes the trends in prices for the different 
expenditure categories, and reveals significant differences across them. In the case of Brazil, for 
example, the differential between the inflation rates of food and beverages and transport and 
communications was about 6 percent per year over the period 1988-1996. This amounts to a 
divergence of more than 50 percent on a cumulative basis. Similarly, in Colombia (1997-2003), 
Mexico (1996-2002), and Peru (2001-2003) the differential between these two categories was 
about 3 percent per year, resulting in cumulative differences of 20 percent for Colombia and 
Mexico and about 6 percent for Peru. Inflation in the education category, on the other hand, has 




                                                 
5 In some cases the Housing category is further broken down into Housing and Home equipment. In such cases all 
the calculations in the text were performed taking this disaggregation into account (i.e. distinguishing the specific 
expenditures and price indices of each of these two categories).   7
III. 2 Empirical evidence on inflation inequality  
 
What are the empirical patterns of inflation across households in different percentiles of 
the expenditure distribution? The first issue to consider is whose inflation rate is best captured by 
standard CPI inflation. For the U.K., Muellbauer (1974) estimates that CPI inflation is close to 
the inflation rate faced by a household in the 71 percentile, whereas for the U.S. Deaton (1998) 
estimates that it approaches the inflation of the 75 percentile.  
 
Given the higher income and consumption inequality of the Latin American countries 
under analysis here, one would expect the CPI to represent an even higher percentile of the 
distribution.  Figure 1 plots the effective annual inflation of the different percentiles and the 
average CPI￿based inflation for the last available spell for each country.
6 The figure reveals 
three interesting facts. First, the line describing the percentile-specific inflation rates crosses the 
horizontal line that describes CPI inflation between the 80 and 90 percentile (more specifically, 
between the 80 and 85 percentile in Brazil, Mexico and Peru and between the 85 and 90 
percentile in Colombia). This indicates that in all countries under analysis CPI-based inflation is 
most representative of the inflation rate experienced by a household in the highest quintile. 
 
Second, the percentile-specific inflation rates in Figure 1 display in all cases a rising 
pattern, implying that in the episodes shown richer households experienced higher inflation than 
poorer ones ￿ in other words, inflation was anti-rich. More formally, Table 7 reports the results 
of regressing the percentile-specific inflation rate on the percentile and a constant term, for the 
nine episodes under consideration. It indicates that, except in the case of Mexico (1994 ￿ 1996), 
the inflation rate always rises significantly with the percentile ￿ i.e., higher percentiles have 
significantly higher inflation rates. 
 
Third, the difference between the inflation rates of the richest and the poorest is of a 
significant magnitude. For example, in Brazil (1988-1996) the difference between the inflation of 
the highest and lowest quintiles was close to 7 percentage points per year. In Colombia (1997-
2003), Mexico (1996-2002) and Peru (2001-2003), the inflation differential was smaller but still 
noticeable, at .5-.7 percentage points per year. Similarly, the difference between average CPI 
inflation and the inflation of the lowest percentiles is not negligible either for the same periods ￿ 
some .3 percentage points per year in Peru, .4 in Mexico and Colombia, and 4 percentage points 
in Brazil.  
 
For all the spells under consideration, Table 8 summarizes the inflation rates by quintile, 
and their respective deviation from standard CPI inflation. For the most part, the table conveys 
the same message as Figure 1 above. In the episodes considered, inflation has consistently been 
anti-rich, with poorer households experiencing lower inflation rates than richer ones. The only 
exception was Mexico in 1994-1996.  
 
For comparison, Table 8 also reports the growth rate of real household consumption by 
quintile, computed using each percentile￿s consumption price index. This provides a rough 
                                                 
6 Due to unavailability of expenditure surveys for the exact years on which official CPIs are based, we use the 
expenditures from the survey closest to the CPI base year in each country in order to mimic the base-period 
households￿ baskets. In particular, we use as base periods 1996, 1997, 2002 and 1995 for Brazil, Colombia, Mexico 
and Peru respectively (the official base periods are Dec 1993, Dec 1998, Jun-Dec 2002 and 1994 respectively).   8
benchmark to better judge the order of magnitude of the measurement error incurred by 
(wrongly) using the same CPI inflation rate for all households, as done in conventional practice. 
Such practice implies a misstatement of the growth rate of their real expenditures, with the 
magnitude of the error given by the differential between the household-specific inflation rate and 
standard CPI inflation.  It is clear from Table 8 that the error can be quite substantial, in some 
cases even exceeding the growth rate of real consumption ￿ e.g., for the first quintile in Brazil as 
well as Mexico over 1994-1996. On the whole, the inflation differentials for the first quintile 
range from some 150 percent of its real consumption growth in these two episodes, to a low of 8 
percent in Mexico over 1984-1989. Overall, the average of all 9 spells under analysis is around 
40 percent. 
 
III.3 Quality change bias and inflation inequality 
 
  Can these discrepancies between the inflation rates of rich and poor be an artifact of 
quality change bias (QCB) in their respective consumption price indices? Quality change is 
commonly viewed as one of the key sources of bias in the CPI.
7 When an existing product is 
replaced by a newer, higher-quality substitute carrying a higher price, the CPI captures the price 
increase but not the quality improvement. Indeed, the Boskin et al. (1996) Senate commission 
concluded that the U.S. CPI overstates the true inflation rate by about .6 percent per year due to 
QCB. For Japan, Shiratzuka (1999) places the inflation overstatement between .3 and .9 percent 
per year, whereas for Spain Ruiz Castillo et al. (2002) put it at about .4 percent per year.  
 
  Of course, if all individuals faced the same quality changes, QCB would be of no 
consequence for inflation inequality. However, Deaton (1998) argues that new products most 
affected by quality change are disproportionately consumed by the rich, in which case QCB will 
lead to an overestimation of the inflation of the better off, more so than for the inflation of the 
poor. If true, this might account for the general anti-rich pattern of inflation found above. 
 
  To assess this issue, we compute some rough estimates of QCB for the 9 spells under 
consideration. To do this, we follow Ruiz-Castillo et. al. (1999) and use a corrected version of 
the QCB estimates for the different types of goods employed by the Boskin Commission.
8 In 
particular, letting bi be the best estimate of the QCB in the measurement of inflation of good i 





h b s b  and the individual price index after the correction for the QCB as  ( )
h h
t b CPI − 1.  
The results of the exercise are presented in Table 9. 
 
Two main messages emerge from the table. First, our estimated QCB for the different 
consumer price indices is in line with other estimates reported in the literature. They range from 
about .40 in Peru over 1995-1999 and 1999-2001, to .54 in Brazil for 1988-1996. Second, the 
QCB of the different quintiles does tend to increase with the level of per capita expenditure, as 
argued by Deaton -- i.e., the QCB is larger for richer than for poorer households. However, QCB 
differences across quintiles are fairly small, at least when compared with the differences between 
quintile-specific and overall CPI  inflation rates reported earlier in Table 8. From this we 
conclude that QCB does not appear to be a significant driver of the inflation differentials across 
                                                 
7Another source of bias is the use of fixed base-period weights in the calculation of the CPI, as it amounts to 
ignoring substitutability across goods. This is taken up below. 
8 See table 2 in Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999)   9
individuals. 
 
III.4 Substitution across goods and inflation inequality 
 
The other well-known shortcoming of the standard CPI stems from its use of a Laspeyres 
framework of fixed base-year weights, which amounts to ignoring substitution across goods and 
hence leads to overstating inflation. This makes the CPI an upper bound for a true cost-of-living 
index; see e.g., Diewert (1998).  
 
In this regard, the Boskin report identified two types of substitution bias. The first, 
estimated to raise measured inflation by 0.25 percentage point annually, is lower-level 
substitution bias and occurs when consumers substitute between similar items within a category 
(e.g., substituting between pippin and gala apples). The second type, estimated to boost inflation 
by 0.15 percentage point annually, is called upper-level substitution bias and occurs when 
consumers substitute between items from different categories (computers for television sets, for 
example) in response to price changes. 
 
From the perspective of inflation inequality, the overstatement of inflation implied by the 
substitution bias is a concern if it differs between rich and poor households. This is not entirely 
implausible; for example, if the rich enjoy broader upper-level (i.e., inter-category) substitution 
possibilities than the poor (because their consumption basket includes a lower share of hard-to-
replace items such as food, say) then the CPI would exaggerate the inflation rate faced by the 
rich more than that faced by the poor. In a similar fashion, lower-level (i.e., intra-category) 
substitution could broaden the gap between inflation of poor and rich because the latter might 
have access to a wider variety of within-category substitutes. Under these conditions, our finding 
above of anti-rich inflation could be partly an artifact of the use of a Laspeyres index. 
 
An indirect way to assess this issue is to compute a Paasche index, whose weights are 
given by the current consumption basket, rather than that of the initial period, thereby capturing 
the effects of substitution across goods on households￿ consumption patterns. Following the 
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However, the Paasche index raises the opposite problem of that posed by the Laspeyres 
index, namely that it tends to understate inflation by overstating the degree of substitution. The 
ideal Fisher index, given by the geometric average of the Laspeyres and Paasche indices, has 
been shown to provide a much better alternative, and is in fact viewed by many as the best 
practical approximation of a true cost-of-living index (see Diewert 1998). 
   10
Table 10 reports calculations using all three alternative indices. The figures show that the 
specific choice of index is of little consequence for the estimated inflation differentials across 
households. The use of end-period weights leads, in general, to a reduction in the computed 
inflation rates of all quintiles, as should be expected, but also to a slight decline in the estimated 
differential of the lowest quintile (although there are exceptions to this rule, e.g., some specific 
episodes in Peru and Mexico). Results with the Fisher index fall somewhere in between those 
obtained with the Laspeyres and Paasche indices, as should be the case. In any event, both Table 
10 and Figure 2 show that the same pattern of inflation inequality remains, regardless of the 
choice of CPI definition. 
 
III. 5 The distributional impact of inflation inequality 
 
We turn to assessing the extent to which inflation inequality drives the observed trends in 
nominal inequality. As already noted, this is of particular interest in the countries under analysis, 
given their extremely high levels of inequality (DeFerranti et al 2004). 
 
To this end, we evaluate each household￿s first-period expenditure basket at second-
period prices ￿ i.e., in terms of the notation in equation (4), we compute x2,1. The difference 
between the (nominal) inequality index in the second period x(x2), and the inequality index 
computed on this re-evaluated spending x(x2,1), captures the real component of the change in the 
nominal inequality index ￿ for short, the change in real inequality. In turn, the difference 
between the inequality index computed on the re-evaluated spending x(x2,1) and the first-period 
nominal inequality index x(x1) measures the contribution of inflation inequality to the observed 
change in nominal inequality. 
 
Implementation of this procedure obviously requires a suitable inequality index x(.). We 
use two kinds of indices. First, the Gini coefficient. Second, indices of the generalized entropy 
family x(d). In particular, we take d = 0, which yields the mean of the logarithmic deviation, and 
d = 1, which yields the Theil index. 
 
Table 11 shows the results of this analysis for the various country episodes under 
consideration. The first two columns report the nominal inequality indices in the initial and final 
year of each episode, and the third column shows the percentage change in nominal inequality 
over the period. Note that inequality declined in six out of the nine episodes under consideration. 
The fourth and fifth columns break down the observed percentage change in nominal inequality 
into the part attributable to inflation inequality across households and that attributable to real 
inequality changes, as in equations (4)-(5). 
 
Inspection of Table 11 reveals three main facts. First, prices (i.e., inflation differentials) 
play a non-negligible role in observed nominal inequality changes. Their contribution is of the 
same order of magnitude as that of real inequality changes, although the latter generally is 
somewhat larger (in absolute value).  
 
Second, in all but one of the episodes under analysis, inflation differentials contributed to 
increasing nominal inequality. In other words, in all those episodes the changes in nominal 
inequality provide an upward-biased measure of the underlying changes in real inequality. The 
only exception to this rule is the Mexico 1994-1996 Tequila episode which, as Tables 7 to 10 
showed, is also the only one in our sample featuring an anti-poor pattern of inflation   11
differentials.  
 
Third, in the majority of spells (six out of nine), the respective contributions of price 
changes and of real expenditure changes to nominal inequality trends were of opposite signs. 
Loosely speaking, in these episodes inflation inequality partially offsets real inequality. In some 
cases (e.g., Brazil 1988-1996) real and nominal inequality indices move in opposite directions. In 
others, the direction of change in nominal and real inequality is the same but the respective 
magnitudes are very different ￿ e.g., in Mexico (1984-1989) we find, by any of the indices 
considered, a modest decline in nominal inequality, but a much bigger one in real inequality.   
 
  It is worth noting that these results arise from a decomposition of nominal inequality 
changes in which the contribution of price changes is calculated on the initial-year consumption 
basket, as can be seen from equation (4) above. Alternatively, the calculations could make use of 
the final-year basket, yielding the alternative decomposition 
 
Dx  =  [x(xt-1,t) - x(xt-1)]  + [x(xt) - x(xt-1,t)].      (4￿) 
 
As with (4), the first term in the right-hand side of (4￿) captures the change in real 
inequality, while the second reflects the contribution of price changes. Crawford and Smith 
(2002) report that when inequality decompositions are performed over long time spells and based 
upon levels of inequality indicators, the results turn out to depend on the base year. However, 
when looking at changes instead of levels of the inequality indicators, they find that yearly 
variations are not sensitive to the selection of reference basket.  
 
Hence, in our case we might expect that the choice between (4) and (4￿) should not make 
a big difference. This is explored in the last two columns of Table 11, which report the results 
obtained using the decomposition in (4￿). Comparison with the two preceding columns, based on 
(4), reveals only slight changes in the results. It also confirms the finding in Table 9 that when 
final-period baskets are used, the relative contribution of prices is diminished due to the 
substitution effects, but the trends in real and nominal inequality measures are largely unaffected.  
IV. Conclusions 
Differences in spending patterns across households, together with differences in the 
evolution of prices across goods, imply that different households face different inflation rates. 
This has potentially important implications for the extent to which standard CPI inflation can be 
viewed as a meaningful summary measure of the price trends faced by consumers, particularly 
those at the bottom of the income distribution, as well as for its frequent use as benchmark for 
cost-of-living adjustment of public transfers and administered prices.  
Furthermore, the fact that different households face different inflation rates also means 
that conventional assessments of distributional trends based only on nominal income and/or 
expenditure may provide a misleading guide to the trends in the distribution of their constant-
price counterparts. Such discrepancy between trends in nominal and real inequality arises when 
inflation differentials across households are systematically related to their income (or 
expenditure) differentials. 
This paper has explored these issues using household survey data from four Latin   12
American countries. The focus on these countries is of particular interest because of their 
persistently high inequality. Indeed, we find that in these countries the conventional CPI  
inflation rate actually represents the price trends faced by a household in the top quintile of the 
expenditure distribution. 
Our findings can be summarized in four main points. First, in virtually all of the episodes 
analyzed, inflation differentials across households in different quintiles of the expenditure 
distribution are fairly substantial, of an order of magnitude similar to that of their respective rates 
of real consumption growth. In general, the standard CPI inflation typically reflects the inflation 
rate faced by a consumer located in the 80 to 90 percentile of the expenditure distribution. 
Second, in all but one of the country episodes analyzed, inflation was anti-rich ￿ i.e.,  
households in the upper quintiles of the distribution faced higher inflation than those in the lower 
quintiles. The exception was Mexico￿s Tequila episode, in which inflation was anti-poor. 
  Third, inflation heterogeneity across households accounts for a big chunk of the observed 
changes in nominal inequality. We reach this conclusion from a decomposition of trends in 
nominal inequality into two separate portions attributable to inflation differntials and to trends in 
real inequality, respectively.  
Fourth, in our sample changes in nominal inequality provide an upward-biased measure 
of the underlying changes in real inequality. The reason is that in all but one of the episodes 
examined (with the Tequila crisis again as the exception), inflation differentials contributed to 
increasing nominal inequality. 
These results are robust to (i) corrections for quality change bias in the CPI; (ii) the use of 
alternative price indices (Laspeyres, Paasche, Fisher); and (iii) the use of alternative inequality 
indices in the decompositions. One immediate implication of our findings is that the overall 
picture of distributional trends in Latin America may be less gloomy than commonly thought, 
once the focus of attention shifts from nominal inequality to real inequality.   13
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Table 1. Surveys used in the analysis 




Sample Size  
(# of households) 
1988 03/87-02/88 Cross  section 13,611  Brazil  Family Budget 
Survey (Pesquisa 
sobre Orcamentos 
Familiares - POF) 
1996 10/01/95-
09/30/96 
Cross section 19,816 
1997 08/25/97  to 
11/15/97 
Cross section 10,016  Colombia  Living Standard 
Survey (Encuesta 






Cross section 24,090 
1984 3
rd quarter  Cross section 4,768 
1989 3
rd quarter  Cross section 11,531 
1994 3
rd quarter  Cross section 12,815 
1996 3
rd quarter  Cross section 14,042 





Ingresos y Gastos 
de los Hogares - 
ENIGH) 
2002 08/21-11/15 Cross  section 20,252 
1995 4
th quarter  Cross section 20,443 
1999 Nov-Dec    Panel  4,016 
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1 10.17 38.31 8.94 21.95 6.91 13.72 5.76
2 11.67 31.36 9.94 23.60 6.94 16.49 8.96
3 11.88 26.17 13.88 22.57 7.15 18.35 13.45
4 10.13 19.81 15.09 26.45 7.33 21.19 21.43
5 8.22 11.79 20.02 26.96 6.30 26.72 50.40
All 9.54 18.72 16.60 25.67 6.73 22.75 100.00
1 6.42 37.21 11.79 27.98 7.63 8.98 5.89
2 6.67 30.68 14.99 29.75 7.92 10.00 8.73
3 6.30 25.40 16.69 31.16 8.33 12.14 13.41
4 5.42 21.16 19.91 30.97 8.81 13.73 21.32
5 4.16 13.20 25.25 35.51 7.61 14.27 50.65
All 5.07 19.47 21.27 33.01 7.99 13.19 100.00
1988
1996
Note: The table reports the composition of expenditure by population quintile of the expenditure distribution 
corresponding to six expenditure categories in each of the surveys analyzed.     19









1 3.31 11.08 49.25 7.59 12.75 10.96 5.06 7.88
2 3.90 12.29 45.32 8.54 13.91 10.56 5.49 10.79
3 4.17 11.53 38.65 12.10 15.97 10.60 6.99 14.27
4 4.30 12.21 32.26 14.71 16.61 10.23 9.69 20.45
5 3.88 13.08 20.78 19.16 15.74 9.26 18.11 46.63
All 3.97 12.44 30.57 15.19 15.52 9.92 12.41 100.00
1 4.50 7.27 45.34 8.11 24.48 4.31 6.00 8.44
2 5.51 7.44 41.31 9.36 26.11 3.96 6.32 10.80
3 5.04 9.36 36.21 11.47 26.03 4.11 7.78 14.86
4 4.72 10.38 30.26 12.48 27.12 4.64 10.41 20.76
5 3.64 9.98 21.83 14.36 26.38 5.51 18.30 45.14
All 4.35 9.47 29.80 12.47 26.29 4.85 12.77 100.00
1997
2003
Note: The table reports the composition of expenditure by population quintile of the expenditure distribution corresponding to seven 
expenditure categories in each of the surveys analyzed.   
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1 7.07 4.36 56.49 5.37 15.38 3.00 8.33 6.24
2 7.06 4.56 54.82 6.93 15.15 3.45 8.05 11.15
3 7.62 6.57 49.21 8.24 15.64 2.61 10.12 14.72
4 7.83 6.85 44.55 10.39 16.99 2.18 11.22 21.83
5 5.73 6.07 24.08 15.40 14.31 2.20 32.22 46.06
All 6.70 6.04 37.70 11.68 15.25 2.45 20.20 100.00
1 7.82 4.75 55.42 6.04 16.36 4.00 5.61 6.52
2 7.66 5.84 50.04 7.88 17.01 2.42 9.16 11.14
3 8.13 6.59 46.39 9.07 17.44 3.24 9.16 15.31
4 8.44 6.29 39.98 10.46 19.97 2.92 11.93 20.55
5 6.74 7.74 25.14 14.66 19.14 3.47 23.12 46.48
All 7.48 6.86 36.19 11.62 18.63 3.24 15.99 100.00
1 7.00 6.26 50.60 9.08 17.63 3.63 5.79 6.28
2 7.27 7.42 46.42 11.19 17.97 3.31 6.41 11.13
3 8.14 7.99 41.91 12.74 18.95 3.37 6.91 14.63
4 7.99 9.07 36.06 14.29 21.08 3.59 7.93 20.61
5 7.06 14.62 23.16 16.77 23.35 4.14 10.91 47.35
All 7.43 11.18 32.88 14.56 21.28 3.79 8.89 100.00
1 5.89 7.01 53.97 8.20 16.34 2.89 8.20 6.95
2 5.87 8.36 47.46 11.56 17.52 2.97 11.56 11.75
3 5.82 8.87 43.57 13.23 18.57 3.31 13.23 15.61
4 6.54 10.17 37.39 15.59 19.69 3.22 15.59 21.43
5 6.27 14.01 23.85 18.98 22.82 3.82 18.98 44.26
All 6.19 11.23 34.70 15.74 20.41 3.44 15.74 100.00
1 5.85 13.54 45.69 10.31 14.05 2.38 8.18 6.67
2 5.53 12.41 40.80 14.65 15.07 2.66 8.88 11.32
3 5.80 14.50 35.28 16.77 15.36 2.89 9.40 14.84
4 6.19 15.11 31.55 18.14 15.33 2.97 10.71 20.39
5 5.60 21.57 20.50 20.06 16.34 3.11 12.83 46.78
All 5.76 17.63 28.93 17.92 15.70 2.95 11.13 100.00
Note: The table reports the composition of expenditure by population quintile of the expenditure distribution corresponding to seven 
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1 4.27 1.49 55.50 4.28 28.01 4.89 1.55 8.39
2 4.05 2.36 52.85 5.86 28.54 4.42 1.92 12.07
3 3.76 3.29 48.35 7.46 30.29 4.48 2.38 16.24
4 4.11 4.87 42.01 8.28 33.92 4.29 2.52 22.73
5 4.34 7.78 30.09 9.94 41.72 3.66 2.47 40.58
All 4.15 5.21 40.64 8.19 35.35 4.13 2.32 100.00
1 4.75 5.48 52.94 1.25 21.14 5.22 9.23 6.14
2 3.53 6.19 51.93 2.40 22.60 3.49 9.87 10.96
3 3.79 7.18 48.31 3.28 23.01 3.57 10.86 16.05
4 3.81 8.86 43.06 4.28 24.73 3.33 11.93 21.68
5 3.21 13.17 25.06 12.30 35.31 3.19 7.77 45.17
All 3.56 10.04 37.35 7.35 28.78 3.44 9.49 100.00
1 6.03 5.83 56.75 3.58 13.68 4.31 9.82 6.82
2 4.82 6.22 56.66 3.79 13.39 4.20 10.93 11.58
3 3.94 7.81 53.77 4.87 13.50 3.91 12.20 17.63
4 3.61 9.80 48.95 6.86 13.65 4.16 12.98 24.35
5 3.55 14.73 35.00 13.65 17.09 4.35 11.65 39.62
All 3.95 10.71 45.70 8.62 14.96 4.21 11.86 100.00
1 7.63 5.10 54.86 3.80 14.36 4.82 9.43 6.80
2 5.74 5.46 55.31 3.97 13.12 5.12 11.30 11.80
3 5.12 6.46 51.64 5.15 13.81 5.14 12.69 17.38
4 4.69 8.24 46.88 7.31 14.02 5.46 13.41 23.19
5 3.61 13.66 33.29 13.90 18.76 5.94 10.85 40.83
All 4.65 9.60 43.70 8.99 15.84 5.51 11.72 100.00
Note: The table reports the composition of expenditure by population quintile of the expenditure distribution corresponding to seven 
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Table 6. Inflation by expenditure category (average annual rate) 






Brazil 1988-1996 663.46 716.30 722.00 759.69 739.63 735.91
Colombia 1997-2003 3.73 10.11 10.35 13.96 7.64 12.93 13.33
Mexico 1984-1989 73.79 80.44 76.79 75.71 78.21 77.26 86.39
1989-1994 11.18 21.38 13.45 18.46 21.84 16.58 16.09
1994-1996 31.36 27.22 40.41 36.38 29.46 37.50 27.78
1996-2002 12.11 14.00 10.97 13.04 12.14 13.70 14.23
Peru 1995-1999 7.34 10.01 6.72 10.02 8.78 11.14 7.70
1999-2001 2.96 4.34 0.60 6.74 8.13 6.76 4.78
2001-2003 1.04 2.38 0.26 3.89 2.10 3.11 0.53
Note: The table reports the inflation rate by expenditure category over the spells under analysis. In Brazil, the education category is 
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Table 7. Tests of inflation inequality 
Country Period Constant Percentile R2
Brazil 1988-1996 724.27* 0.07* 0.61
(0.34) (0.01)
Colombia 1997-2003 10.34* 0.01* 0.48
(0.04) (0.001)
Mexico 1984-1989 77.42* 0.01* 0.47
(0.04) (0.001)
1989-1994 15.66* 0.02* 0.76
(0.05) (0.001)
1994-1996 35.67* -0.03* 0.79
(0.08) (0.001)
1996-2002 11.94* 0.01* 0.85
(0.02) (0.0003)
Peru 1995-1999 7.66* 0.01* 0.83
(0.02) (0.0003)
1999-2001 3.41* 0.02* 0.84
(0.04) (0.001)
2001-2003 1.18* 0.01* 0.86
(0.01) (0.0003)
(*) Significant at the 5%.
Note: The table reports regression results with the inflation rate by
percentile as dependent variable and the corresponding percentile and a
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Table 8. Inflation by population quintile 
Period Quintile Quintile Inflation Inflation Differential Growth
1988-1996 1 725.47 4.48 2.68
2 726.43 3.51 1.95
3 727.59 2.36 2.09
4 729.06 0.89 1.89
5 732.02 -2.08 1.65
All 729.95 1.84
1997-2003 1 10.53 0.37 1.50
2 10.50 0.40 0.38
3 10.61 0.29 0.94
4 10.76 0.14 0.38
5 11.20 -0.30 -0.81
All 10.90 0.00
1984-1989 1 77.58 0.30 3.76
2 77.60 0.29 2.83
3 77.65 0.23 3.63
4 77.73 0.16 1.54
5 78.15 -0.27 2.71
All 77.88 2.68
1989-1994 1 15.94 0.83 4.33
2 16.17 0.59 4.88
3 16.42 0.34 3.74
4 16.51 0.26 4.66
5 17.26 -0.49 4.32
All 16.77 4.37
1994-1996 1 35.12 -1.34 -0.89
2 34.92 -1.14 -3.08
3 34.47 -0.69 -2.22
4 34.17 -0.39 -3.27
5 32.92 0.86 -7.41
All 33.78 -4.85
1996-2002 1 12.08 0.39 4.08
2 12.17 0.30 4.09
3 12.30 0.17 3.73
4 12.38 0.09 3.67
5 12.69 -0.22 5.21
All 12.47 4.45
1995-1999 1 7.79 0.37 -6.45
2 7.86 0.30 -1.33
3 7.98 0.18 0.66
4 8.13 0.03 -0.37
5 8.41 -0.25 3.29
All 8.16 0.79
1999-2001 1 3.75 0.87 7.60
2 3.89 0.73 4.80
3 4.16 0.46 6.59
4 4.52 0.10 7.42
5 5.24 -0.62 -5.73
All 4.62 1.25
2001-2003 1 1.28 0.32 3.35
2 1.35 0.25 4.38
3 1.46 0.14 2.57
4 1.58 0.02 0.69






Note: The table reports the annual inflation rate by population quintile of the expenditure distribution, the difference
between the inflation rate corresponding to each quintile and the average inflation rate, and the estimated annual growth
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Table 9. Quality Change Bias and inflation inequality by population quintile 





1988-1996 1 725.47 0.501 721.33 4.12
2 726.43 0.523 722.11 3.35
3 727.59 0.543 723.09 2.36
4 729.06 0.558 724.43 1.02
5 732.02 0.541 727.53 -2.07
All 729.95 0.541 725.45
1997-2003 1 10.53 0.399 10.09 0.30
2 10.50 0.407 10.05 0.34
3 10.61 0.420 10.15 0.24
4 10.76 0.446 10.26 0.13
5 11.20 0.482 10.66 -0.27
All 10.90 0.450 10.39
1984-1989 1 77.58 0.387 76.90 0.24
2 77.60 0.365 76.95 0.19
3 77.65 0.395 76.95 0.19
4 77.73 0.406 77.00 0.13
5 78.15 0.448 77.35 -0.21
All 77.88 0.418 77.14
1989-1994 1 15.94 0.385 15.50 0.76
2 16.17 0.389 15.72 0.54
3 16.42 0.407 15.95 0.31
4 16.51 0.425 16.02 0.24
5 17.26 0.466 16.71 -0.46
All 16.77 0.435 16.26
1994-1996 1 35.12 0.354 34.64 -1.38
2 34.92 0.371 34.42 -1.16
3 34.47 0.387 33.95 -0.69
4 34.17 0.404 33.63 -0.37
5 32.92 0.450 32.32 0.94
All 33.78 0.414 33.26
1996-2002 1 12.08 0.365 11.67 0.32
2 12.17 0.379 11.74 0.25
3 12.30 0.399 11.85 0.14
4 12.38 0.413 11.92 0.07
5 12.69 0.442 12.20 -0.21
All 12.47 0.418 11.99
1995-1999 1 7.79 0.406 7.35 0.41
2 7.86 0.363 7.47 0.30
3 7.98 0.376 7.58 0.19
4 8.13 0.384 7.72 0.05
5 8.41 0.418 7.96 -0.19
All 8.16 0.397 7.77
1999-2001 1 3.75 0.383 3.35 0.79
2 3.89 0.374 3.51 0.64
3 4.16 0.370 3.77 0.37
4 4.52 0.385 4.12 0.03
5 5.24 0.422 4.79 -0.65
All 4.62 0.396 4.14
2001-2003 1 1.28 0.408 0.87 0.32
2 1.35 0.403 0.94 0.24
3 1.46 0.409 1.04 0.14
4 1.58 0.425 1.15 0.04
5 1.81 0.461 1.34 -0.15
All 1.60 0.433 1.19
Note: The table reports the inflation rate by population quintile of the expenditure distribution, the quality change bias (QCB), the
inflation rate by quintile once the QCB is taken into account (corrected inflation), and the difference between the corrected inflation rate
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1988-1996 1 725.47 4.48 722.37 3.85 723.92 4.16
2 726.43 3.51 722.69 3.53 724.56 3.52
3 727.59 2.36 723.96 2.26 725.77 2.31
4 729.06 0.89 725.04 1.18 727.05 1.04
5 732.02 -2.08 728.42 -2.20 730.22 -2.14
All 729.95 726.22 728.08
1997-2003 1 10.53 0.37 9.85 0.30 10.19 0.33
2 10.50 0.40 9.77 0.38 10.13 0.38
3 10.61 0.29 9.92 0.23 10.27 0.25
4 10.76 0.14 10.02 0.12 10.39 0.13
5 11.20 -0.30 10.42 -0.28 10.81 -0.29
All 10.90 10.15 10.52
1984-1989 1 77.58 0.30 77.99 1.05 77.79 0.67
2 77.60 0.29 77.68 1.36 77.64 0.82
3 77.65 0.23 78.11 0.94 77.88 0.58
4 77.73 0.16 78.30 0.75 78.01 0.45
5 78.15 -0.27 80.11 -1.07 79.13 -0.67
All 77.88 79.04 78.46
1989-1994 1 15.94 0.83 15.34 0.63 15.64 0.72
2 16.17 0.59 15.44 0.53 15.81 0.56
3 16.42 0.34 15.58 0.40 16.00 0.37
4 16.51 0.26 15.63 0.34 16.07 0.29
5 17.26 -0.49 16.46 -0.49 16.86 -0.50
All 16.77 15.97 16.37
1994-1996 1 35.12 -1.34 36.06 -1.53 35.59 -1.44
2 34.92 -1.14 35.60 -1.08 35.26 -1.11
3 34.47 -0.69 35.27 -0.75 34.87 -0.72
4 34.17 -0.39 34.85 -0.32 34.51 -0.36
5 32.92 0.86 33.61 0.91 33.27 0.88
All 33.78 34.53 34.15
1996-2002 1 12.08 0.39 11.87 0.38 11.97 0.39
2 12.17 0.30 11.99 0.26 12.08 0.28
3 12.30 0.17 12.06 0.18 12.18 0.18
4 12.38 0.09 12.16 0.08 12.27 0.08
5 12.69 -0.22 12.47 -0.23 12.58 -0.23
All 12.47 12.24 12.36
1995-1999 1 7.79 0.37 7.69 0.39 7.74 0.38
2 7.86 0.30 7.70 0.38 7.78 0.34
3 7.98 0.18 7.79 0.29 7.89 0.23
4 8.13 0.03 7.89 0.19 8.01 0.11
5 8.41 -0.25 8.40 -0.32 8.41 -0.29
All 8.16 8.08 8.12
1999-2001 1 3.75 0.87 1.93 0.35 2.84 0.41
2 3.89 0.73 1.99 0.29 2.94 0.31
3 4.16 0.46 2.12 0.16 3.13 0.11
4 4.52 0.10 2.33 -0.05 3.42 -0.17
5 5.24 -0.62 2.70 -0.42 3.96 -0.71
All 4.62 2.28 3.25
2001-2003 1 1.28 0.32 0.95 0.40 1.12 0.36
2 1.35 0.25 0.92 0.43 1.14 0.34
3 1.46 0.14 1.09 0.26 1.28 0.20
4 1.58 0.02 1.22 0.14 1.40 0.08
5 1.81 -0.20 1.71 -0.35 1.76 -0.28
All 1.60 1.36 1.47
Note: The table reports the inflation rate by population quintile of the expenditure distribution and the difference between the inflation rate corresponding to
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1988 - 1996 GINI Coefficient 0.54 0.55 1.60 2.17 -0.58 1.45 0.14
Mean Log Deviation  0.55 0.57 4.56 4.34 0.21 3.24 1.32
Theil Index  0.57 0.59 3.44 6.56 -3.12 3.41 0.03
1997 - 2003 GINI Coefficient 0.53 0.50 -5.49 1.92 -7.41 0.95 -6.43
Mean Log Deviation  0.51 0.45 -11.87 4.02 -15.89 1.76 -13.63
Theil Index  0.53 0.47 -11.76 5.16 -16.92 2.12 -13.89
1984 - 1989 GINI Coefficient 0.50 0.50 -0.20 2.77 -2.97 2.02 -2.21
Mean Log Deviation  0.48 0.47 -1.96 5.07 -7.03 3.89 -5.85
Theil Index  0.50 0.50 -0.03 8.91 -8.94 5.19 -5.23
1989 - 1994 GINI Coefficient 0.50 0.49 -1.85 1.38 -3.23 1.50 -3.35
Mean Log Deviation  0.47 0.44 -5.11 2.30 -7.41 2.85 -7.96
Theil Index  0.50 0.45 -10.27 3.66 -13.93 3.34 -13.62
1994 - 1996 GINI Coefficient 0.49 0.46 -6.88 -1.30 -5.57 -1.08 -5.79
Mean Log Deviation  0.44 0.38 -13.79 -2.44 -11.35 -1.96 -11.83
Theil Index  0.45 0.39 -13.48 -3.14 -10.33 -2.34 -11.14
1996 - 2002 GINI Coefficient 0.46 0.49 6.32 1.42 4.90 1.02 5.30
Mean Log Deviation  0.38 0.43 12.51 2.88 9.63 2.22 10.29
Theil Index  0.39 0.45 14.06 3.42 10.64 2.53 11.53
1995 - 1999 GINI Coefficient 0.46 0.50 9.91 1.28 8.63 0.79 9.13
Mean Log Deviation  0.38 0.51 34.43 2.56 31.88 1.80 32.63
Theil Index  0.38 0.46 21.54 2.98 18.55 2.05 19.48
1999 - 2001 GINI Coefficient 0.50 0.49 -2.72 1.05 -3.78 0.40 -3.13
Mean Log Deviation  0.51 0.49 -4.06 1.78 -5.84 0.75 -4.80
Theil Index  0.46 0.42 -7.32 2.71 -10.03 1.00 -8.32
2001 - 2003 GINI Coefficient 0.49 0.48 -1.21 0.47 -1.67 0.40 -1.60
Mean Log Deviation  0.49 0.47 -3.97 0.82 -4.79 0.69 -4.66
Theil Index  0.42 0.41 -2.05 1.19 -3.24 0.98 -3.03
Base in final period
Note: The table reports the change in different inequality indices between the initial and final period for each spell under analysis. The table also 
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